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Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-44
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, section 14

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY CORP.,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case NO.920086-CA

HAROLD BECKSTEAD,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.
section 78-2a-3(2)(d)

("appeals from the circuit courts, except

those from the small claims department of a circuit court.")
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Should this court abandon the pretext search doctrine?

2.

Was the trial court clearly erroneous in finding that

Officer Wasden was justified in stopping defendant Beckstead even
though there was no traffic violation which would warrant the
stop, and that the officer had only a "..."hunch, *I suspected
that he may have been drinking based on the driving pattern I had
seen. 7 ?"

6

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The trial court's findings of fact are entitled to deference
and are to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258, and n.5 (Utah 1987).
Questions of law are to be reviewed by this Court for
correctness.

Scharf v. BMG Corp.f 700 P.2d 1068, 1070, (Utah

1985) .
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provisions are at issue in this
case:
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thin to be seized.
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or thing to be seized.

7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Beckstead was charged with one count of driving under
the influence of alcohol or drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-44 (Supp. 1990).
On the 10th day of July, 1991, counsel for Mr. Beckstead
filed a Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss on the Grounds of
Pretext Stop performed by Officer Wasden of the Salt Lake City
Police Department on the 17th day of March, 1991.

A copy of the

motion to dismiss is contained in Appendix 1 to this brief.

A

copy of the Relevant portions of the transcript (hereinafter
referred to as T.) is contained in Appendix 2.
At the Jury Trial, held on the 12th day of August, 1991,
counsel for the defense cross-examined Officer Wasden concerning
the stop of Mr. Beckstead. (T. 1-16)
The City made a motion to declare a mistrial following the
testimony which was granted by Judge Jones on the 12th day of
August, 1991.

The matter was then reset for Jury Trial on the

6th day of September, 1991 and the jury was excused.
Defense counsel filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on
the 5th day of September, 1991, based on Judge Jones7 order
denying Defendant's Motion to dismiss on the Grounds of Pretext
Stop.
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Defense counsel submitted a Motion to Stay Proceedings in
the Trial Court Pending Ruling in the Utah Court of Appeals on
Defendant and Appellant's Petition for Permission to Appeal
Interlocutory Order which was granted by the trial court on the
5th day of September, 1991.
Counsel requested Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
from the trial court on the 4th day of September, 1991, yet none
was received by defense counsel.
The Court of Appeals denied Defendant's Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal on the 18th day of November, 1991. The
matter was then reset for jury trial on the 20th day of December,
1991 at which time the Defendant entered a plea of Nolo
Contendere conditional upon Defendant appealing the trial court's
denial of the Motion to Dismiss on the Grounds of Pretext Stop.
Defendant then filed the present appeal on the 11th day of
February, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Officer Wasden was the only witness testifying at the Jury
Trial regarding the pretext stop motion.

During cross-

examination by Defense Counsel, Officer Wasden stated, when asked
if Mr. Beckstead had violated any traffic laws, "No, sir." (T.
10).

He also agreed that Mr. Beckstead "didn't do any kind of

9

traffic violation that would warrant pulling him over?" "No,
sir."

(T. 11).

Officer Wasden also testified that Mr. Beckstead7s alleged
weaving did not endanger any other vehicle as the lane he was
driving in was very wide.

(T. 12). However, he still proceeded

to stop Mr. Beckstead based solely on his suspicion that Mr.
Beckstead had been drinking. (T. 13).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This court should not abandon the pretext search
doctrine discussed in State v Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

This court should reverse the trial court/s finding that

Officer Wasden did not act pretextually in stopping Mr.
Beckstead.

The trial court's ruling that Officer Wasden's stop

of Mr. Beckstead was not pretextual was due to the court's
feeling that probable cause existed for the stop based solely on
Mr. Beckstead's driving pattern.
The trial court's findings are clearly erroneous in finding
that Officer Wasden was justified in stopping Mr. Beckstead due
to Officer Wasden's testimony that there was no traffic violation
which would warrant pulling Mr. Beckstead over.
In the event that this Court requires additional findings of
fact, it should direct the trial court to find (1) whether
Officer Wasden's "hunch" that Mr. Beckstead was driving under the
10

influence was justification for the stop and (2) whether a
reasonable hypothetical officer would have stopped Mr. Beckstead.
ARGUMENT
The issue before this Court has been hotly debated in this
and other jurisdictions.

However, well established precedent

regarding the illegality of pretext stops provides that this
Court should find that based on the facts of the case the stop of
Mr. Beckstead was Pretextual.

This Court stated in State v.

Lopezf 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (1992), that,
"The question of whether a warrantless police traffic
stop violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution is particularly fact sensitive and, thus, we
review the underlying facts of this case in detail. State
v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah App. 1989); State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah App. 1988); rev'd on other
grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)."
As in Lopez. the facts of this case are the most important
factor in determining this issue.

In Beckstead, as in Lopez,

Officer Wasden was the only witness called during the dismissal
hearing, and the facts are therefore largely based upon his
testimony.
L

DEFINITION AND APPLICATION OP THE PRETEXT DOCTRINE

The pretext doctrine has been defined by many courts in
search and seizure cases.

As this Court stated in Lopez P

In recent years, this court has joined other courts in
construing the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment
by adopting what we now commonly refer to as the "pretext
doctrine." See, e.g.r Grovier, 808 F.2d at 135-37; State v.
11

Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216-17;
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-80; see also United States v.
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986); sources
cited in footnote eight. In Utah, the pretext doctrine
applies in cases where an officer claims to have stopped a
vehicle for a minor traffic violation, but where the court
determines the stop was not made because of the traffic
violation but rather due to an unconstitutional motivation
and, therefore, the has deviated from the normal course of
action expected of a reasonable officer. Sierra. 754 P.2d
at 978. We have articulated the pretext doctrine as whether
a "reasonable . . . officer, in view of the totality of the
circumstances confronting him or her, would have stopped"
the vehicle for the traffic violation absent the
unconstitutional motivation. Id.
This Court's opinion that the pretext doctrine applies
in cases where there is a minor traffic violation is vitally
important to the instant case.

In the instant case there was

absolutely no traffic violation which wold have given Officer
Wasden probable cause to stop Mr. Beckstead.

The Court goes

further to state that,
"This court has utilized the "pretext" doctrine in two
distinct situations. First, we have applied it where the
facts demonstrated the driver did not commit a traffic
violation.1 Baird, 763 P.2d at 1217; Sierra, 754 P.2d at
979."
Id. at 6.

1

There is little question that under these circumstances
a traffic stop is unconstitutional. Judge Russon's dissenting
opinion would recognize such stops as unconstitutional.
12

Additionally,
"There is little question that under these
circumstances a traffic stop is unconstitutional. Judge
Russon's dissenting opinion would recognize such stops as
unconstitutional." Id.
In Lopez the Court has found that this variation of the pretext
doctrine; i.e., where a traffic violation has not occurred is
unconstitutional, and as such, should find that the stop in the
instant case unconstitutional as well.
The Court has approved the pretext doctrine's validity
numerous times in other cases. (See State v. Lovegrenf 798 P.2d
767, 770 n.10 (Utah App. 1990) (Bench, Davidson, and Orme, J.J.);
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 (Bench, Billings, Orme, J.J.);
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1990) (Billings,
Davidson, and Jackson, J.J.); State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154
(Utah App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990) (Billings, Bench, and Garff, J.J.); State v. Talbot. 792
P. 2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App. 1990) (Billings, Greenwood, and Orme,
J.J.); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78 (Billings, Bench, and Jackson,
J.J.)).

Additionally, there have been several federal circuit

courts which have approved the pretext doctrine.

See Guzman, 864

F.2d at 1515; United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d at 710-11.2
2

But see United States v. Trigg. 925 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th
Cir.) (rejecting pretext doctrine), cert, denied sub nom..
Cummins v. United States,
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991);
United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1990)
13

In Lopez f the Court indicated that,
In 1990, the Utah Supreme Court, by implication,
ratified our application of the pretext doctrine in State v.
Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). There, the Utah
Supreme Court reached the issue of whether a voluntary
consent which occurred after a pretextual traffic stop was
sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegal pretext stop
to allow the consent to validate the warrantless search. If
the Arroyo court disapproved of the pretext doctrine, logic
suggests the court would have rejected the doctrine and
reversed this court without ever reaching the attenuationconsent issue. In fact, the Arroyo court referred to our
pretext holding with approval:
[t]he court of appeals agreed [with the lower
court's pretext finding], stating that under the
totality of the circumstances, "a reasonable
officer would not have stopped Arroyo and cited
him for %following too closely' except for some
unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal
activity." The trial court and the court of
appeals were clearly correct on [the pretext]
issue—Trooper Manqelson's stop was an
unconstitutional pretext.
Id. (emphasis added, citations omitted). Additionally, the
majority of other states which have considered the issue
have adopted the pretext doctrine.
These cases fully support the validity and approval of the
pretext doctrine by numerous courts throughout the land as well
as this Court. As a result, this Court, based on the
circumstances in the instant case, has a duty to uphold the
pretext doctrine and reverse the trial court's erroneous ruling.

(same), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991).
14

II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
secures the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend IV.
The issues presented now on appeal pertain specifically to
the Fourth Amendment and the pretext doctrine.

The trial court

contends Officer Wasner was justified in stopping Mr. Beckstead
even though no traffic violation had occurred which would justify
the officer's stop of Mr. Beckstead. The Court has joined other
courts in construing the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment by adopting what we now commonly refer to as the
"pretext doctrine." Seer e.g.. Grovier, 808 F.2d at 135-37; State
v. Marshallr 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216-17; Sierra, 754
P.2d at 977-80; see also United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512,
1518-19 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704,
708 (11th Cir. 1986);
The Court also stated that,
15

We are persuaded the pretext doctrine is necessary to
prevent the abuse of various exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment7s warrant requirement. See United States v.
Triggf 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the
doctrine protects citizens from arbitrary activity by police
officers and supports the Fourth Amendment's requirement of
objective reasonableness to support any invasion by law
enforcement. See Maryland v. Maconf 472 U.S. 463, 470-71,
105 S. Ct. 2778, 2783 (1985); Scott v. United States, 436
U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723 (1978). Finally, the
pretext doctrine requires courts to focus on the realities
of police practices—not pretenses—thus protecting the
integrity of the courts. See United States v. Keller, 499
F. Supp. 415, 418 (N.D. 111. 1980); Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 689.
The Court goes further, stating,
"Allowing police officers to stop vehicles for any
minor violation when the officer in fact is pursuing a hunch
would allow officers to seize almost any individual on the
basis of otherwise unconstitutional objectives. Such
unfettered discretion offends the Fourth Amendment. See
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968);
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 711."
Additionally,
"Accordingly, we reaffirm our adoption of the pretext
doctrine. It protects the privacy of all individuals by
requiring that police be consistent in their enforcement of
traffic regulations and prevents police from conducting
warrantless searches and seizures based on an otherwise
insufficient hunch of more serious criminal activity."
III.

THE REASONABLE OFFICER STANDARD

In Lopez, the Court ruled that,
"...the issue of whether a traffic stop is a pretext
stop cannot turn on the issue of an officer's subjective
intent, but rather, must turn on the objective question of
whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop under
the same circumstances absent the illegal motivation.
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d
at 710-11; Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1097.
16

"[A] stop [i]s unreasonable not because the
officer secretly hope[s] to find evidence of
a greater offense, but because it [i]s clear
that an officer would have been uninterested
in pursuing the lessor offense absent that
hope." In other words, "the proper basis of
concern is not with why the officer deviated
from the usual practice in this case but
simply that he did deviate."
Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517 (quoting United States v.
Smith, 799 F.2d at 709 and 1 W. Lafave, Searches and
Seizures § 1.4(e) at 94).
In a pretext stop setting, such as we have in the instant
case the Court held that,
"...the State first has the burden to show the
warrantless traffic stop is lawful. Thus, the State must
establish that a traffic violation occurred in the officer's
presence or that the officer had probable cause or a
reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation had
occurred. Cf. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 709
("weaving" not a violation of Florida Law). Once the State
makes this showing, the defendant must put forth some
evidence to support the defendant's claim that the stop was
a pretext stop. Cf. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 886 (party with
burden of pleading affirmative defense has burden of going
forward with evidence sufficient to raise issue).
If the defendant sufficiently raises the pretext issue,
the burden of proof is then ultimately upon the State to
show that a reasonable officer would have
made the stop
absent the alleged illegal motivation.3 Seer e.a>, Mann,
3

The ultimate burden of proof is properly on the State for
several reasons. First, because the seizure was conducted
without a warrant, the State should bear the burden of showing
the stop was not an intrusion on the defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy, including a showing of what a reasonable
officer would do under the same circumstances. See Arroyo. 796
P.2d at 695. Additionally, because the State has the primary
access to most of the relevant evidence, including the officer's
past stop practices and the practices of other officers, we
believe the burden of proof is properly placed on the State.
17

712 P.2d at 10 (State must show valid legal basis for stop
and within exception to warrant rule); see also Arroyor 796
P.2d at 687-88 (in consent setting, State has burden of
showing consent was voluntary).
In the instant case, Officer Wasden based his stop on nothing
more than a hunch that the defendant was driving under the
influence of alcohol. Therefore, if the reasonable officer
standard is applied, it becomes apparent that without further
evidence, the stop was pretextual. The Court ruled for the
Defendants in a similar case stating that,
"Officer Rawlinson's decision to search Defendants' vehicle
was based on nothing more than a "hunch" that the search
would yield drugs.
In short, Officer Rawlinson was unable to articulate
sufficient facts that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that Defendants were under the influence of drugs
of alcohol, much less that they had committed or were about
to commit a crime, such as drug trafficking. Although
Officer Rawlinson's "hunch" ultimately proved to be correct,
a "hunch," without more, is not sufficient to raise a
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 (citing Terry. 392 U.S. at 27, 88
S.Ct. at 1883); accord Godina-Luna. 179 Utah Adv. Rep. at
23. Accordingly, we conclude that Officer Rawlinson's
detention of Defendant exceed the scope of the traffic stop,
was not justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, and was therefore illegal."
State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) at 6.

Seer e.q.r Staheli v. Farmers' Coop., 655 P.2d 680, 683 (Utah
1982) (burden of proof lies with party most likely to have access
to evidence).
18

CONCLUSION
This Court's past experience with the issue of pretext stop
and its prior rulings on such matters are clearly outlined above.
Based upon those prior rulings and the facts in the instant case,
this Court should uphold the pretext doctrine in the instant
case, reverse the trial court7s findings, and remand the case
back to the trial court.

/

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / A~dav of April, 1992.

L. J&mLawyer for Mr. Bfeckstead
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L. Long #1989
Lawyer for Defendant
39 Exchange Place #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 583-9207
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY CORP.,
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case no. 912010903
Hon. Maurice D. Jones

HAROLD BECKSTEAD,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the defendant, by and through his counsel of record,
L. Long, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to dismiss this
matter on the grounds that the arresting officer did not have
probable cause to stop the vehicle and therefore the stop was a
pretext for further inquiry.
Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.
,
DATED this # / ^ f a f April, 1991.

- Thomas Jefferson

CERTIFICATE Of SERVICE
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e J j j T d a y of

AjP&M~-

, 1991, I

p e r s o n a l l y delivered/jaGrijfcfed t h e preceding Motion t o Dismiss t o
the following:

Clerk of the Court
Third Circuit Court
451 South 200 E^st
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Salt Lake City Prosecutor
451 South 200 E^st
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Hon. Maurice D. Jones
451 South 200 E^st
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Harold Becksteacj
3065 Cascade Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

fP(a4.i /LMl4>h

L. Long, #1989
Lawyer for Defendant
39 Exchange Place, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 583-9207
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

SALT LAKE CITY CORP.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

912010903

HAROLD BECKSTEAD,

Hon. Maurice D. Jones

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the defendant, HAROLD BECKSTEAD, by and through
his counsel of record, L. LONG, and

respectfully enters the

following Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
ARGUMENT
The Stop of Defendant's Vehicle Was Not Based on
a Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity
And Was Therefore a Pretext Stop
Defendant

contends

that

Officer

Wasden's

stop

of

his

vehicle was not based on a reasonable suspicion, but instead was
a pretext, not unlike that in the cases of State v. ArroyoP 770
P. 2d 153 (Utah 1989), and State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2d 972 (Utah
1988). In Sierra, Judge Billings, expounded on the issues of
violation of

an

individual's

rights

under

the United

States

Constitution

and

its

Utah

Constitution

counterparts-

Judge

Billings stated:
In establishing the constitutional standard to stop a
particular automobile, the United States Supreme Court
has clearly denied an officer the right to randomly
stop cars on public roads. See
Prouse, 440 U.S. at
662; State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1983)
(quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662, 99 S.Ct. at 1400).
In reaching this conclusion, the Court has stated:
Were the individual subject to unfettered
governmental intrusion every time he entered
an automobile, the security guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment would be
seriously
circumscribed. As Terry y, Ohio, [392 U.S. 1
(1968)], recognized, people are not shorn of
all Fourth Amendment protection when they
step from their homes onto the public
sidewalks.
Nor are they shorn of those
interests when they step from those sidewalks
into their automobiles.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663-65, 99 S.Ct. at 1401-02.

[I]t is impermissible for law enforcement officers to
use a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to search for
evidence of a more serious crime. See United States v.
Millio, 588 F. Supp. 45, 49 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
Accord
United States vs. Lef kowitz f 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52
S.Ct. 420, 424, 76 L.Ed. §77 (1932); Taolavore v.
United States, 291 F.2d 262, 565 (9th Cir. 1961).
The violation of a constitutional right by a
subterfuge cannot be justified. . . . Were
the use of misdemeanor arrest warrants as a
pretext for searching people suspected of
felonies to be permitted, a mockery could be
made of the Fourth Amendment
and its
guarantees.
The courts must be vigilant to
detect and prevent sucfy a misuse of legal
processes.
Taglavore, 291 F.2d at 266.
2

In determining whether a stop for a traffic
violation and subsequent arrest is a pretext, the
totality of the circumstances governs. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. at 885 n.10, 95 S.Ct. at 2582 n.10. In making
this determination the subjective intent of the officer
is irrelevant.
"Whether a Fourth Amendment violation
has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the
officer's
actions
in
light
of
the
facts
and
circumstances confronting him at the time,' and not on
the officer's actual state of mind at the time the
challenged action was taken." Mary1and v. Macon, 472
U.S. 463, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985)
(quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136
(1978)).
Accord Morane v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106
S.Ct. 1135, 1142, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); United States
v. Carson. 793 F.2d 1141, 1149 (10th Cir. 1986)
(quoting Morane v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct.
1135, 1142, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). The Supreme Court,
almost without exception, has emphasized objectivity
in evaluating purported fourth amendment violations.
[T]he Court has first undertaken an objective
assessment of an officer's actions in light
of the facts and circumstances then known to
him.
The language of the Amendment itself
proscribes
"unreasonable"
searches
and
seizures. In Terry, the Court emphasized the
objective aspect of the term reasonable.
. . .
And in making that assessment it is
imperative that the facts be judged against
an objective
standard; would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of
the seizure or the search "warrant [an
officer] of reasonable
caution in the
belief"
that
the
action
taken
was
appropriate?
Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 137, 98 S.Ct.
1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (citations omitted).
State

v.

Sierra,

724

P.2d

at

977-78.

The

circumstances

surrounding the stop in the instant action are not circumstances
under which a citizen would be stopped by a traffic officer on
3

routine

patrol, unless

that

officer

were

looking

for drunk

drivers.
An individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures

is protected

and guaranteed

both by the Fourth

Amendment and by the provisions of Article I, Section 14 of the
Constitution of Utah.

The Fourth Amendment states:

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the person or things to be seized.
The following analysis, quoted at length, was presented by
The Honorable Lynn W. Davis, Judge of the Utah Fourth Circuit:
Court, in an article printed in the October, 1989 American Bar
Journal, vol 2, no. 8.
Government uhas a legitimate interest in crime
prevention and detection." State v. Trulillo, 739
P. 2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987).
But personal
privacy rights are paramount, and intrusion must be
scrutinized under the protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment.
The balance between public
interest and an individual's constitutionally
guaranteed right to personal security and privacy
tilts
in
favor
of
freedom
from
police
interference. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
These interests often compete; public interest
in crime prevention may conflict with an
individual's right to be free from arbitrary

4

interference from law officers. 1
The state also
has a strong interest in safeguarding citizens'
rights of privacy, liberty and ^ autonomy against
unsanctioned or unfettered intrusions.
The
United
States
Supreme
Court
first
explicitly permitted a seizure upon suspicion short
of probable cause in the landmark case of Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
In Terry, a veteran
police officer observed two men whom he believed
were casing a store for a robbery.
An on-thestreet confrontation resulted in a pat-down search
of the suspect and the discovery of a weapon. The
court found the government's interest in crime
prevention and detection outweighed the suspect's
right of privacy and recognized the search as an
exception to the probable cause requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.
Terry teaches that a police officer may not
act
on
a
hunch,
mere
speculation
or
unparticularized suspicion, but only on specific
reasonable inferences based on facts, in light of
the officer's experience, Tel. at 27.
While not
capable
of
precise
definition,
"reasonable
suspicion" has been characterized as a combination
of specific and articulable facts together with
reasonable inferences from those facts, which, in
light of the officer's experience, reasonably
justify a belief that the person to be stopped had
committed, was committing or was about to commit a
crime. Id.
The Court reaffirmed the reasonable suspicion
test in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 <1983),
where it stated that "the predicate permitting
seizures upon suspicion short of probable cause in
1

The Utah Supreme Court recognized
this
conflict in State v. Lopez, 552 P. 2d 120 (1976);
State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (1977); 'State
v. Wittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (1980); and State v.
Porsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986). The Utah Court
of Appeals recognized these competing interests in
its first reasonable suspicion case, State v.
Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah &pp. 1987).
5

that law enforcement interest warrant a limited
intrusion on the personal security of the suspect."
The standard articulated in Terry and also in Brown
v. Texas has come to be known as the "reasonable
suspicion11 test. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422~U.S. 873, 882-84 (1975).
What is the proper scope of the reasonable
suspicion test? In a long line of cases, the Court
has significantly expanded the application of the
test. 2
Terry involved a violent crime in which
there was a legitimate fear of immediate physical
danger to the officer.
However, it is clear that
the reasonable suspicion test applies to factual
setting beyond the enforcement need as presented in
Terry.
There is also no doubt that it applies to
vehicle stops as well as on-the-street detentions.
Most recently it has been applied to the growing
number of drug courier profile cases. 3
Terry
insists that the conduct of officers enforcing the
law be subjected to the more "detached, neutral
scrutiny
of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure."
392 U. S. at 21-22.
However, the court in Terry
failed to explain what quantum of suspicion is
necessary to justify an investigatory stop or
search.
In addition, Terry and its progeny have
failed
to
announce
a definitive
standard
enunciating at what point of an investigatory stop
Fourth Amendment protections are implicated. These
issues continue to plague appellate and trial
courts.
THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD APPLIED IN UTAH
2

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128
(1978); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
3

United States v. Medenhall, 446 U.S. 544
(1980); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438. (1980);
Florida v. Rover f 460 U.S. 491 (1983);Florida v.
Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984); United States v.
Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989)
6

Ucah
courts
have
long
recognized
the
"reasonable suspicion" standard and have applied it
in a growing number of investigative stop cases. 4
This standard is codified in Utah Code Ann. Sect.
77-7-15(1982):
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and
may demand his name, address, and an
explanation of his actions.
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah
Court of Appeals have been particularly active in
deciding investigatory stop cases in the last
several years. 5
It is significant "Co note that
4

From March 1985 through August 15, 1989, the
Utah Supreme Court decided seven investigative stop
cases. From June 1987 through June 1989, the Utah
Court of Appeals decided nine such cases. Several
cases involve overlapping issues.
5

Here is a chronological

review

of the Utah

Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals cases
discussing
"reasonable suspicion" standards in
conjunction with an investigative stop or search:
State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d. 1302 (Utah 1983).
Police stopped defendant based upon the belief that
his driver's license had been revoked. The officer
had previously arrested defendant for DUI and knew
his license status.
the Court held that officer
had reasonable suspicion that the license was still
revoked, conviction affirmed.
State v. Swaniaan, 699 P.2d. 718 (Utah 1985).
Description of two men seen in area by another
officer two hours previously was insufficient to
give officer reasonable suspicion to stop two men
walking at 1:40
a.m. three blocks from the
burglary. The investigatory stop was improper and
the evidence seized was not admissible to burglary
trial. Conviction reversed.
State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d-f. 675 (Utah 1986).
7

The facts are complex and reader is referred to
text.
The majority held that there was probable
cause
for officer's stop and search of the
vehicle. Drug charge affirmed.
Dorsey is included herein because Justice
Zimmerman's
concurring opinion challenges the
applicability of the probable cause standard,
substituting an investigative stop standard in its
place. Justice Zimmerman concluded that the search
was lawful as incident to a Terry stop, and the
reasoning
is important
to any
practitioner
attempting to understand the application of an
investigative Terry stop standard in Utah.
State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d. 125 (Utah
1979).
Officer had reasonable suspicion to stop
automobile because officer knew of revoked license
and outstanding arrest warrant.
Conviction
affirmed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d. 616 (Utah 1987).
Police responded to burglar alarm at video shop.
Upon arriving, officers observed a vehicle leaving
the area. One followed the vehicle to a residence
and waited for occupants to exit it. He called to
them and asked if he could speak to them.
Then
crossed the street and presented identification
upon request. Neither defendant was arrested. The
officer returned to the shop, determined that a VCR
was missing
and returned
to
the residence.
Defendants agreed to talk to him and allowed him to
look in the vehicle.
Officer observed a black
rectangular object and arrested defendants.
An officer may approach citizen at any time
and ask questions so long as the citizen is not
detained against his will.
In this case, citizens
willingly talked to officers; therefore trial court
did no err in refusing to suppress evidence. (The
court also outlined two other constitutionally
permissible police encounters: (1) an officer may
seize a person if he has an articulable suspicion
that the person has or is about to commit a crime;
the detention must be temporary and last no longer
than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop; (2) an officer may arrest a suspect if he has
probable cause to believe an offense has been or is
8

being committed.) The Utah Supreme Court relied on
United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d. 223 (5th Cir.
1984).
State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d. 85 (Utah App.
1987).
Officer detained trio of pedestrians who
admittedly had not violated any traffic ordinances
or engaged in any criminal behavior.
Officer
based his initial detention upon four factors: (1)
it was a high-crime area; (2) lateness of the hour;
(3) apparent nervous conduct of trio; and (4)
"suspicious" nylon knapsack Trujillo carried.
Officer testified that his search of Trujillo, on
whom a knife was discovered (forming the basis of
the felony charge), was based upon "intuition."
Officer's seizure and subsequent search of
Trujillo violated Fourth Amendment.
Knife should
have been suppressed.
No reasonable suspicion
found; conviction reversed.
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d. 181 (Utah 1987).
Police stopped car on 1-15 south of St. George,
Utah, based on: (1) apparent Latin descent of
occupants; (2) route of travel; (3) time of day
(4:50
a.m.);
(4)
time
of
year
(March);
(5) California license plates; (6) erratic driving
pattern with police car tailing two to six feet
behind; (7) nervous behavior of occupants.
Court held that officers
did
not have
reasonable suspicion that defendants were engaged
in illegal activity.
Therefore, trial court's
finding that the stop violated defendant's Fourth
Amendment
rights was not clearly erroneous.
Suppression of evidence affirmed.
Court further held the Utah Fourth Amendment
Act, which purported to create a "good faith"
exception to such searches, unconstitutional.
A
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule can
never apply to an investigatory stop and search in
that, if no reasonable suspicion exists to justify
the investigatory stop, the officer's conduct was
not reasonable within the meaning of the exception,
and, in any event, the exception cannot operate
where there is no outside authority on which the
officer reasonably relied.
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2dA 972 (Utah 1988).
9

Sierra, driving northbound on 1-15 in vehicle with
New York plates, was stopped for minor traffic
violation because of his "suspicious nature" and
his failure to make eye contact with officer.
A
search of auto revealed drugs. Court found officer
did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Sierra.
Reversed and remanded.
Court announced a "hypothetical reasonable
officer" standard; if a hypothetical reasonable
officer would not have stopped the driver for the
cited
traffic
offense
and
the
surrounding
circumstances indicate the stop is a pretext, the
stop is unconstitutional.
State v. Aquilar, 758 P. 2d. 457 (Utah App.
1988).
Aquilar involved an investigatory stop on
1-15 where written consent to search van was
obtained.
A search revealed
383 pounds of
marijuana.
In light of Sierra, the initial stop
was suspect but Court declined to address whether
the stop was a violation of Aquilar's Fourth
Amendment rights, finding that voluntary consent
to search purges the taint of any illegality.
Conviction affirmed.
State v. Seryf 758 P.2d. 935 (Utah App. 1988).
Sery arrived at the Salt Lake International Airport
carrying a blue suitcase with brown trim, there was
nothing unusual about his appearance or attire.
After what appears to be normal activity in an
airport, he was detained by three officers,
questioned and released. He was later detained
again outside the terminal, taken back inside, and,
based upon a canine drug sniff of his luggage was
arrested.
Seven facts were enumerated by respondent in
support of
the reasonableness
of
officer's
suspicion.
Sery
(1) arrived
from Florida;
(2) waited a few minutes at the gate and looked
nervously in direction of officers; (3) went to
telephone booth and twice stood up and looked in
direction of officers, (4) took strange route from
phone booth area back to concourse; (5) possessed
plane ticket on which he claimed his name had been
inaccurately recorded; <6) told officer he had no
identification on him; and (7)^ left a telephone
10

number with airline reservationist that had been
changed to an unpublished number.
Court found that the facts relied upon by
officer did not support a reasonable suspicion that
Sery was engaged in criminal activity. Because the
seizure of Sery and his bag for the canine drug
sniff violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the
evidence found in the search of his bag should have
been suppressed.
Conviction reversed and case
remanded.
State v. Baumgaertel, 762 P. 2d 2 (Utah App.
1988).
Deputy based his decision to follow
defendant's pickup truck upon his observation that
he had seen this particular truck when he had
inspected Ernie's Automotive parking lot just 15
minutes earlier, and that there was no legitimate
reason for truck to be there, since Ernie's had
been
closed
for
over
eight
hours.
This
observation elevated the deputy's decision to
follow the truck from a mere hunch to a fact
sufficient for deputy to conclude that occupants
may have been engaged in criminal activity.
Conviction affirmed.
State v. Baird, 763 P. 2d. 1214 {Utah App.
1988).
Defendant's conviction for possession of
165 pounds of marijuana found in trunk of car he
was driving reversed because officer stopped car
on a hunch; "something just struck [him] funny"
about the license plate sticker.
State attempted
to justify the stop
by evidence discovered
afterward, including
a twisted-off gas cap,
defendant's confusion about the ownership of the
car and the smell of marijuana.
While this may
have justified a further inquiry of the driver
after a valid stop, more articulated suspicion must
be present at the time of the stop and must be the
reason for the stop.
In this case, no reasonable
or articulable suspicion existed to justify the
stop.
The evidence used to convict defendant was
derived by exploitation of the impermissible stop,
and it should have been suppressed.
Conviction
reversed.
State v. Arroyo, 770 P. 2d 153 (Utah App.
1989).
Judgment for defendant based on ruling
11

that officer's stop was a pretext was reversed
because a search conducted pursuant to voluntary
consent purges the taint from the prior illegality.
State bears burden of proving that consent was
voluntarily given. Defendant freely admitted that
his consent to search was voluntary before the
trial judge, but denied it on appeal.
However,
defendant's consent had been established and purged
the taint of the illegal stop, thereby making
admissible the kilogram of cocaine found inside the
passenger door panel. Conviction affirmed.
State v. Johnson, 771 P. 2d 326 (Utah App.
1989).
Officer stopped vehicle for faulty brake
light. Defendant was passenger. Driver had ID but
no registration, and ID did not match the name of
registered
owner
obtained
through
dispatch.
Officer requested identification from passenger,
reasoning that vehicle may be stolen. Officer ran
a license check on driver and passenger and
determined driver was driving on suspension and
passenger had several warrants.
Incident to the
arrest, a backpack belonging to defendant was
searched and was found to contain amphetamines,
drug
paraphernalia
and
defendant's
Utah
identification. Court held that nominal allusions
to the Utah Constitution at trial were insufficient
to preserve issue on appeal.
Court further held
that there was reasonable suspicion to support the
seizure in that the car could have been stolen and
defendant was not detained for an unreasonable
period of time. Conviction affirmed.
State v. Holmes, 774 P. 2d. 506 (Utah App.
1989).
Defendant was passenger in vehicle which
was
stopped
by
two
plainclothes
officers.
Defendant was observed standing on a sidewalk
talking with other male drivers and got into a
vehicle after conversing briefly with driver.
Officers
suspected a "prostitution deal" and
followed the vehicle. After observing a "somewhat
evasive" driving pattern, officer stopped the
vehicle. One officer approached driver, and other
officer watched passenger. Officer testified as to
"furtive gestures" of defendant, observed her take
something from her purse and stu£f it down between
12

in the majority of those decisions, the courts have
not found the requisite reasonable bnd articulable
suspicion necessary to sustain an investigatory
stop, search or seizure. Those decisions have
largely resulted in acquittals or in suppression of
the evidence.6
UTAH APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS RELATING TO
INVESTIGATORY STOPS HAVE RELIED UPON TRADITIONAL
the car seat and console.
Officer demanded the
material and finally reached in and obtained it.
Inside he discovered syringes containing cocaine.
Court found reasonable and articulate suspicion to
support: the stopping of the vehicle, but found the
search illegal.
Defendant's conviction for
attempted possession of a controlled substance
reversed and case remanded.
State v. Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 38
(1989).
Defendant was passenger in vehicle
stopped for speeding. Officer witnessed passenger
bending forward in vehicle, acting fidgety, turning
to left and right, and turning back to look at
officer. Upon stopping vehicle, driver exited with
valid driver's license and valid registration.
Defendant's behavior led officer to conclude that
he was trying to hide something.
Officer asked
Schlosser for identification as a pretense for
trying to determine what he may have been hiding.
Officer opened truck door, scanning interior for
contraband, and saw a bag of marijuana. He also
smelled marijuana smoke. Court found no reasonable
articulable suspicion to support the search. Court
also found that the opening of the door by officer
exceeded the legitimate objectives of the traffic
stop..
The "furtive movements" of passenger did
not give rise to an articulable suspicion
suggesting criminal activity. Court affirmed trial
court's suppression of the evidence, finding
neither reasonable suspicion for probable cause to
support the search.
6

It is the observation of this authoir, though
not yet empirically supported, that the acquittal
rate in investigatory cases is significantly higher
than in other appellate criminal -flecision areas.
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FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENTIAL ARGUMENTS, NOT
UPON INDEPENDENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
The language of Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution is virtually identical with that
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. That may be one reason why the Utah
Supreme Court
"has never drawn
distinctions
between the protections afforded by the respective
constitutional provision. Rather, the [c]ourt has
always considered the protections afforded to be
one and the same." State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219,
1221 (Utah 1988).
Yet in the same opinion, the
Court announced its interest in the applicability
of an Article I, Section 14 argument by stating,
"Indeed, choosing to give the Utah Constitution a
somewhat different construction may prove to be an
appropriate method for translating the state's
citizens
from
the vagaries
of
inconsistent
interpretations given the Fourth Amendment by the
federal courts. Id. at 1221 n.8. Thus is appears
that the Court has not foreclosed the possibility
of distinguishing the protections afforded by the
respective constitutional provisions in a future
case.
At the very least, there are mixed signals
from the Courts.
While Utah has developed no separate body of
state constitutional search and seizure law, both
Justices Durham and Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme
Court have expressed a willingness to seriously
consider an analytical approach praised on Article
I, Section 14 arguments.'
Justice Zimmerman has
1

See, e.g. State v. Earl, 716 P.2d. 803
(Utah 1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P. 2d. 261 (Utah
1986) {Durham, J., concurring on Utah Constitution
Articles I and V grounds); State v. Mendoza, 748
P.2d. 181 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring);
State Farm Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d. 1042
(Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting); State v.
Hygh, 711 P.2d. 264, 281-73{Utah 1985) (Zimmerman,
J. , concurring) ; American Fork City v. Cosgrove,
701 P.2d. 1069 (Utah 1985) (Durham, J., for the
majority, relies upon the Utah Constitution's selfincrimination
provision, Article
I and XII;
14

stated that
"[tjhe federal law as it currently
exists is certainly not the only
permissible
interpretation
of
the
search
and
seizure
protections contained in the Utah Constitution."8
Such an analysis may extend the scope of individual
protection
against unreasonable
searches and
seizures beyond that accorded by the Fourth
Amendment.
Writing for the majority in State v. Earl, 9
Justice Durham noted that neither the state nor the
defendant had discussed or relied independently on
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution.
She further noted that despite the Court's
willingness to independently interpret the Utah
Constitution in other areas of law, "the analysis
of state constitutional issues in criminal appeals
continues to be ignored." 10
Justice Durham
concluded that "[i]t is imperative that Utah
lawyers brief this Court on
relevant state
constitutional questions." 11 Justice Zimmerman was
equally emphatic in State v. Hygh, 1 2 stating that
"(sjound argument may be made in favor of positions
at variance with the current federal law respecting
both the scope of the individual's right to be free
from warrantless searches and seizures and the
remedy for any violation of that right." 1 3
Even in light of these frequent announcements
of receptivity, state constitutional arguments have
rarely been raised in an investigatory stop
Zimmerman, J., concurring, suggests an Article I,
Section 14 analysis).
8

State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d. 264, 273 {Utah 1985).

9

716 P.2d. 803 (Utah 1986)

10

Id. at 806

11

Id.

12

711 P. 2d 264 (Utah 1985)
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IcL. at 272.
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context.
When presented, they have been found to
be inadequately briefed or argued or untimely
raised. A mere five cases are reported.
In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181,187 (Utah
1987), the Utah Supreme Court found no reasonable
suspicion to justify the initial stop of the
subject vehicle.
The Court held that the
investigatory stop violated defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.
State constitutional arguments
were
not
raised.
But
Justice
Zimmerman
independently observed in his concurring opinion
that "the whole question of protections that are
afforded by the remedies available under Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah constitution, "[Utah's] own
search
and
seizure provision has never been
carefully considered by this court." Id. at 187.
Also, in his dissenting opinion in State v. Dorsey,
731 P.2d
1085, n.l
(1986), Justice
Zimmerman
comments on the lack of briefing of the state
constitutional issues.
The Utah Court of Appeals has addressed
Article I, Section 14 arguments in an investigatory
stop context in State v. Aauillar, 758 P. 2d 457
(Utah App. 1988), State v. Arroyo, 770 P. 2d 153
(Utah 1989), and State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326
(Utah App. 1989).
In Aauilar f the Court confined its analysis to
the protections granted under the United States
Constitution.
It did so because "although Aquilar
recited the Utah Constitution's Fourth Amendment
provision in his brief, he did not argue that the
Utah Constitution yields a different result than
the United States Constitution."
Aauilar, at 4 58,
n.l.
See also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,
1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) .
In State v. Arroyo, 770 P. 2d 153, the Court
also confined its analysis to the protections
granted
under
the Fourth Amendment, but for
different reasons. The Court found that "a three
line conclusory statement as to the grea:ter scope
of state constitutional protections
[was] an
insufficient briefing for [the court] too embark on
16

a state constitutional
n. 1.

analysis." Arroyo, at 36,

The Court, in State V. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326,
declined
to consider
a state
constitutional
argument under a preservationist doctrine.
The
Court found that l![n]ominaliy alluding to such
different constitutional guarantees without any
analysis
before
the
trial
court
does
not
sufficiently
raise
the
issue
to
permit
consideration by this court on appeal." Johnson, at
328.
Accord James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801
(Utah App. 1987).
We may conclude from this brief analysis:
1. A nominal invocation of the state
constitution
is insufficient
to raise state
constitutional protections; see also
State v.
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988).
2. State constitutional arguments must be
adequately briefed and argued at every level of the
case.
3. Such arguments must set forth the
reason why the Utah Constitution yields a different
result than the United States Constitution.
Lastly, the Utah Supreme Court has cited
with approval the state constitutional analytical
guidelines set forth in State v. Jewett, 146 Vt.
221, 500 A.2d 233 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . ^
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The Court outlined various, non-exclusive,
analytical approaches including: 1) the use of
fundamentally
historical
materials
including
legislative history; 2) the textual approach
(construction of the language); 3) a sibling-state
approach —
comparing what other states with
identical or similar constitutional clauses have
done; 4) the use of economic and sociological
materials in constitutional litigation. The Court
offered other guidelines and reference materials
and the reader is referred to the text.
For additional information see. Note, The Utah
17

Terry encouraged the judiciary to decide each
case on its own facts.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
Utah appellate courts have appropriately recited
the fact of each case in great detail.
A
determination of the constitutionality of a police
officer's stop of a person under the Fourth
Amendment runs upon the facts of each case. State
v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah App. 1988).
Prosecutors and defense counsel alike err when
citing controlling case law without first urging
the finding of particular facts. Every analytical
stage of an investigative stop case requires a
totality of the circumstances consideration in that
all decisions are highly factual in nature.
For
example, an investigative stop must be limited both
as to scope and duration "to satisfy the conditions
of an investigative seizure."
State v. Serv, 758
P.2d 935, 952 (Utah App. 1988), quoting Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). The length of the
stop, a critical fact to be determined, may
transform it from an authorized Terry stop into a
de facto arrest requiring probable cause, United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
In a suppression hearing, witnesses invariable
offer conflicting versions of the facts. Deference
is traditionally afforded the fact finder to
determine the credibility of witnesses.
State v.
Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984); State v.
Holyoak, 67 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (1987); State v.
Walker, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (1987).
Appellate
courts recognize that the trial judge is in a
preferred
position
to assess the witnesses'
credibility in a suppression hearing. See State v.
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); State v.
Sierra, 754 P. 2d 972.
The trial c o u r t s factual
evaluation underlying its decision to grant or deny
a motion to suppress ought not to be disturbed
Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution,
1986, Utah L. Rev. 319 and Davis & Wallentine, A
Model
for Analyzing the Constitutionality of
Sobriety Roadblock Stops in Utah, 3 BYU J. of Pub.
L. (1989).
18

unless clearly erroneous.
State v. Mendoza, 748
P.2d at 183; Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258.
However, no such deference is afforded the
trial court in its application of the law to the
facts.
The Utah Court of Appeals recently noted
that
"in assessing
the trial
court's legal
conclusions based upon factual findings, we afford
it no deference but apply a 'correction of error'
standard." State v. Johnson, 771 P. 2d at 327,
citing Gates v. Chavez, 749 P. 2d 658, 659 (Utah
1988).
Appellate courts are charged with rhe duty
to correct errors in application of the law to the
facts. Stare v. Swanigan, 699 P. 2d 708, 719 (Utah
1985); State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87(Utah App.
1987).
VEHICLE STOPS ARE "SEIZURES" NECESSITATING
THE OPERATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The Utah Court of Appeals is State v. Sierra,
754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988) agreed with the
U.S. Supreme Court by announcing that "the stopping
of an automobile and the consequent detention of
its occupants constitutes a 'seizure' within the
meaning of rhe Fourth Amendment, despite rhe fact
that the purpose of the stop is limited and the
resulting detention is quite brief." See Delaware
v. Prousef 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); see also State
v.
C o l e , 674
P.2d
119, 123
(Utah
1983).
Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that
any time a police officer stops an automobile, the
stop necessarily involves a seizure requiring
reasonable, articulable suspicion.
State v.
Baird, 763 P. 2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988).
The Court in Sierra further pointed out that a
stop of a vehicle may be constitutionally justified
on one of two alternative grounds.
First,
"reasonable suspicion" must be based upon specific,
articulable facts which, together with rational
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the defendant
had committed or was about to commit a crime.
Sierra, 754 P. 2d at 975; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21;
State v. Christensen, 676 P. 2d 408, 412 (Utah
1984); Trujillo, 739 P. 2d at 88 .-\ Second, the stop
19

could be incident to a lawful
traffic violation. Sierra, Id.

detention

for

a

In the thorny field of investigatory stops,
it is for the fact finder, based upon the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether the
police/citizen encounter amounts to a seizure of
the person, giving rise to Fourth Amendment
protections and scrutiny, or whether the encounter
intrudes
upon
no constitutionally
protected
interests. Utah appellate courts have adopted some
helpful guidelines in this area.
In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987),
the Utah Supreme Court relied upon the standard
enunciated in United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d
223 (5th Cir. 1984).
In Merritt, the Courx:
delineated three levels of police encounters with
the
public
which
the
Court
held
to
be
constitutionally
permissible.
The
Court
established these parameters:
1. An officer may approach citizen any
time and pose questions so long as the citizen is
not detained against his will.
2. An officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the
person has committed or is about to commit a crime;
however, the "detention must be temporary and last
no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop."
3. An officer may arrest a suspect if the
officer has probable cause to believe an offense
has been committed or is being committed. Id. at
230.
Those constitutionally sanctioned levels of
police encounter have also been adopted by the Utah
Court of Appeals in State v. Baird, 763 P. 2d at
1216, and State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals in State v.
Trujillo held that "a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment occurs only when the officer
by means of physical force or the show of authority
has in some way restricted tftfe liberty of the
20

person.M
See also United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). The Truiillo Court went
on to say that n (w]hen a reasonable person, based
on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not
in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's
investigation, but because he believes he is not
free to leave a seizure occurs." 739 P. 2d at 87.
Cf. Florida v. Rover, at 501.
THE "REASONABLE SUSPICION" STANDARD
"No area of law has more bedeviled the
judiciary, from the Justices of the Supreme Court
down
to
the
Magistrate,"
than
the
Fourth
Amendment. 15
As one commentator has pointed out
"[wjhat has bedeviled the justices of the Supreme
Court is the quantum of evidence that is necessary
to
constitute
articulable
suspicion.
The
puzzlement has flowed from the highest court in the
land down to the police officer on the beat." 1 6
Utah's appellate courts have struggled with the
application of the reasonable suspicion standard,
and justices have clashed over critical factors
which trigger its application as opposed to a
probable cause standard. 17
Practitioners, judges, and legal scholars
recognize the difficulty in applying the reasonable
suspicion standard.
The Supreme Court in United
States v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981), noted
that "terms like articulable suspicion and founded
lb

LaFave, Search and Seizure, The Course of
True Law has not...Run Smooth, 1966 U. 111. L. F.
255 (1966)
16

Note, The Limits of an Investigatory Stop
on Grounds Less Than Probable Cause of Individuals
Who Display the Characteristics of a Drug Courier
Profile, Florida v. Royer, 1984 Howard L. Rev. 345.
17

Representative cases where Utah's justice
and judges have been sharply divided include State
v. Schlosser, at 42; Dorsev, at 1090; Sery, at 950;
State v. JohnsonP at 329.
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suspicion are not self-defining; they fall short of
providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad
of factual situations that arise.11
Despite this
reality, Justice Rehnquist announced in the same
opinion that the concept of reasonable suspicion is
"one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in
the Fourth Amendment.11 Id.
The announcement of bright line definitions
and a "litmus-paper test" that many practitioners
seem to demand from our appellate courts would be
strikingly foreign to traditional Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The Utah Court of Appeals
recognized this principle in State v. Serv, 758
P. 2d at 943 n.3, where it noted that "no litmuspaper test can determine whether the police
possessed sufficient facts to justify a person's
seizure." As Justice Rehnquist recently announced
in United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581
(1989), "the concept of reasonable suspicion, like
probable cause, is not 'readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'" See
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
In a recent investigatory stop case, State v.
Baumaaertel, 762 P. 2d 2 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding
that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop
the subject vehicle. The Court stated that "when a
police officer sees or hears conduct which gives
rise to suspicion of crime, he has not only the
right, but the duty to make observations and
investigations to determine whether the law is
being violated; and if so, to take such measures as
are necessary in the enforcement of the law." Id.
at 52 (citations omitted). What conduct gives rise
to suspicion of a crime?
What factors are probative or of little
probative value in determining whether or not an
officer has reasonable suspicion to stop or to
search? Conclusions from extant case law are set
forth below. However, it must be stressed that the
unique combination of facts in each case must be
evaluated and no single factor should be declared
probative or non-probative when separated from its
unique factual setting.
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We may conclude from all recent decisions:
1. Latin descent has only minor probative
value in determining if a suspect has entered the
country illegally.
Mendoza, at 183; Arroyo, at
155.
2. The route of travel and out-of-state
license plates have little probative value in
determining if the officers had a reasonable
suspicion to stop the vehicle. Carpena, at 675.
The fact that a traveler in a drug case
has come from a "major source11 city is of some
significance, but is not: a weighty facror. Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980). See also 3 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure, Secc. 9.3(c) (2d ed. 1987).
An officer's statement that "someching
just struck me funny about [the out-of-state
license plate]" was held insufficient to justify
the stop. State v. Baird, at 1215.
3. The time of year and the time of day
of the stop have little relevance. Mendoza, 748
P.2d at 183; Carpena, at 675; Swaniaan, at 719;
Truiillor at 86.
But the time of day was found
significant in Stare v. Baumaaertel, at 4, in
tandem with other factors.
4. Nervous behavior and failure to make
eye contact.
These are highly ambiguous at best.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
the failure to make eye contact can have no weight
in determining if the officers had a reasonable
suspicion to conduct an investigatory
stop.
Mendoza, at 183-84; Sierra, at 976.
The Court in
Sery further noted that "if the officer cannot
articulate the unusual mannerisms or actions by
the defendant that led to a conclusion of
nervousness, it is impossible for any reviewing
court to determine, after the fact, whether the
person's apparent nervousness was any different
from that observed in countless travelers — of if
the nervousness existed at all." Sery, at 944.
"The
officer's
mere
conclusions
regarding
23

defendant's nervousness, unsupported by relevant
objective facts, can have no weight in determining
if he had a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity."
State v. Dorsev, 731 P. 2d 1085, 1088
(Utah 1986).
The Court in Trujillo concluded that
nervous conduct on the part of the defendant when
confronted
by a law enforcement officer was
"consistent with innocent as well as criminal
behavior."
Lastly, the Court in Sierra concluded
that lack of eye contact affords no weight in
determining if the officer had reasonable suspicion
to conduct the investigatory stop. Sierra, at 975
(citations omitted). 1 8
5. High crime area. Carpena, Swanigan,
and Trujillo suggest that "traveling in a lawful
manner at a late hour in a high crime area and
acting in a nervous manner in the presence of
police is not sufficient to support a reasonable
suspicion that the suspect is involved in criminal
conduct." State v. Baumgaertelf at 4.
" [A]n area's reputation for criminal
activity should not be imputed to an individual."
State v. Holmes, at 509.
A "high crime area"
factor
is insufficient, alone, to constitute
reasonable
suspicion.
Holmes,
at
509.
Nevertheless, it is one factor which can be
considered by the trier of fact in applying a
"totality of the circumstances" analysis.
For
example, an officer was justified in asking
defendants for ID and an explanation of their
13

One legal commentator concludes after his
review of recent drug courier profile cases,
Mendenhall, Reid and Rover, that "nervousness," as
a highly particularized yet plain and subjective
fact, plays an important part in establishing
reasonable suspicion. He suggests that the "use of
the profile was upheld in Mendenhall and Rover and
the only characteristic found in those cases but
not in Reid was "'nervousness.'" Becton, the Drug
Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected • Tho Th'
Infected Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd
Eve, N.C. L. Rev. 458(1987).
24

presence in an area where police had responded to a
burglar alarm. State v. Deitman, at 618.
6. Furtive gestures. In the recent case
of State v. Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 42
n.5, the Court observed that "if furtive gestures
are coupled with prior reliable information
indicating possible criminal conduct, further
investigation may be justified." United States v.
Paiari, 715 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1983). The Court
found the "furtive gestures" in Schlosser to be
insufficient to support reasonable suspicion to
search.
The Court in State v. Holmes, at 511,
announced that furtive movements or gestures "must
be shown which, in the totality of the
circumstances, would lead a reasonable and prudent
person to believe that there is evidence of
criminal activity." It is one factor which can be
considered in the analysis, but, isolated, cannot
be given any weight.
Furtive gestures were
recognized in Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1
(1984).
Furtive gestures by the defendant with
his knapsack were held insufficient in Truiillo,
at 86.
7. Misc .
Faulty equipment:, plus
suspicion of stolen vehicle constituted adequate
reasonable suspicion in State v. Johnson, supra at
326.
The fact that an officer learned only days
before that defendant's license had been revoked,
plus confirmation with dispatch, constituted
reasonable suspicion to stop.
State v
Constantino, 732 P. 2d 125 (Utah 1987). Where an
officer had previously arrested defendant for OUI
and knew his license status, Court held officer had
reasonable suspicion to stop. State v. Gibson, 665
P.2d 1302 (Utah 1983).
Utah courts acknowledge that a trained
law enforcement officer may be able to perceive and
articulate meaning in given conduct which would be
wholly innocent to the untrained eye. Truiillo, at
88; Mendenhall, at 564; State v. Sery, 758 P.2d
935, at 941 (Utah 1988).
However, the officer
frequently does not articulate the perceived
meaning from the subject actions to the trial
court, resulting in a suppression of the evidence.
25

Lastly, Utah courts have further noted that
officers are "entitled to assess the facts in
light of [their] experience." 19
In this regard a
prosecutor errs at a suppression hearing when
failing to elicit the training, experience,
background and schooling of the officer.
A
consideration of that collective experience may be
critical in determining whether the stop was based
upon a hunch or upon articulable suspicion.
THE "HYPOTHETICAL REASONABLE OFFICER" STANDARD
In State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2d 972 (Utah App.
1988), the Utah Court of Appeals announced a legal
framework to protect individuals from pretextual
misdemeanor traffic arrests. The Court stated that
"in traffic violation stops, in balancing the
rights of individuals to be free from arbitrary
interference by law enforcement officers and the
government's interest in crime prevention and
public protection, if a hypothetical reasonable
officer would not have stopped the driver for the
cited
traffic
offense, and
the
surrounding
circumstances indicated the stop is a pretext, the
stop
is unconstitutional."
Sierra, at 979.
Earlier in the Sierra opinion, the Court emphasized
that the proper inquiry is not whether the officer
could validly have made the stop.
Rather, the
focus is on whether a hypothetical reasonable
officer,
in view
of
the
totality
of
the
circumstances, would have stopped the vehicle. Id.
at 978.
In announcing the "hypothetical reasonable
officer" standard, the court relied upon a curious
collection of state and federal cases: United
States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986);
Diaas v. State. 345 So.2d 815 (Fla. App. 1977);
State v. Blair, 691 S.W. 2d 259 (Mo. 1985); State
v. Holmes, 256 So.2d 32, 34 (Fla. App. 1971);
iy

State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d. at 509; see
also State v. Folkes. 565 P. 2d. 1125, 1127 (Utah
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977); BrignoniPonce, 442 U.S. at 885; Brown, 443 U.S. at 52 n.2;
State v. Baumaaertel, 762 P.2d. 2 ^ 4 <Utah App. 1988)
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Urquhart v. State, 261 So.2d 535, 536 (Fla. App.
1972); 5 LaFave Search and Seizure Sect. 5.2(e) (2d
ed. 1987).
Unfortunately, those courts declined
the opportunity to defined "hypothetical reasonable
officer." 20
Likewise, no reported Utah decision
has interpreted "hypothetical reasonable officer."
The Utah Court of Appeals has most recently
applied this standard in State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d
15 3, 15 5.
The Court was persuaded that a
"reasonable officer would not have stopped Arroyo
and cited him for 'following to closely' except for
some unarticulated
suspicion of more serious
criminal activity."
The Court concluded that the
stop was an unconstitutional pretext to search for
drugs.
The announcement of a "hypothetical reasonable
officer" standard presents a host of questions.
What constitutes
the "hypothetical
reasonable
officer?"
Is the standard statewide or regional?
What factors may be relied upon in this difficult
line-drawing exercise?
What if the arresting
officer always cites a violator of a particular
offense, but no one else on the force does?
How
does the imposition of the standard
impact
individual officer's discretion and exercise of
initiative? Does the defense merely have to assert
that a hypothetical reasonable officer would not
have made the
stop in order
to place its
constitutionality at issue?
Does the plaintiff
then have the burden to show that a hypothetical
reasonable officer would have made the stop? What
kind of evidence can be submitted?
Expert
^ u The State cases all rely on State v.
Holmes, 256 So. 2d. 32, which held that a traffic
violator is not immune from the seizure of evidence
of a more serious crime "provided that the gravity
of the traffic offense is such that any citizen
would
routinely
be stopped
for it if seen
committing the offense by a traffic officer on
routine patrol."
Holmes, at 34; Blair;- at 263;
Urquhart, at 536; Diggs , at 816.
At least these
courts
identify
the reasonable officer as a
"traffic officer on routine patr<al."
27

testimony?
Utah courts have recognized that
officers are entitled to asses the facts in light
of their experience-21
Does that individualized
deference to the collective experience of the
officer conflict with the application of the
hypothetical reasonable officer standard?
The employment of this standard thus far is
limited to stops incident to traffic violation.
Ultimately, this strike standard must be applied by
the trier of fact without the benefit of
elucidating criteria. Hopefully, future cases may
address some of these concerns.

21

See note 19
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WHERE NO REASONABLE OR ARTICULABLE SUSPICION
EXISTS TO JUSTIFY THE STOP, AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
IS INSUFFICIENT TO CURE THE ILLEGALITY OF THE STOP
ABSENT AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In State v. Baird, 763, P.2d 1214 (Utah App.
1988), the Court held that the 165 pounds of
marijuana should have been suppressed. An officer,
who was unaware of Arizona's color scheme for
determining license plate sticker validity, lacked
reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop
where the officer later testified that he stopped
the vehicle because "something just struck me funny
about" the sticker. Id.
Lack of reasonable and articulable suspicion
for the initial stop decided consideration of the
after-acquired evidence in justifying the stop.
Baird, at 1215.
"The State attempted to justify
the stop by the after-discovered evidence of new
tires and shocks, a twisted-off gas cap, the jack
in the back seat, the defendant's confusion about:
ownership of the car and the smell of marijuana."
Id. , at 1217. The Court held chat "while this may
have justified a further inquiry of the driver
after a valid stop, such articulable suspicion must
be present at the time of the stop and must be the
reason for the stop." Id.
The Court further
observed that the "evidence used to convict the
defendant was derived by exploitation of the
impermissible stop." Id.

The Arresting Officer Did Not Have
Probable Cause to Arrest the Defendant for DUI
A.

In
Supreme

The odor of alcohol alone is not
sufficient to establish probable
cause for arrest.

several

recent

Court,

the

cases, most

courts

have

notably

focused

on

from

the

the

intoxication necessary to constitute probable cause.
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Colorado

indicia

of

In People

v. Rovbal, 672 P.2d

1003

(Colo. 1983), the Colorado court held

that the odor of alcohol

alone is not sufficient to establish

probable cause for a DUI arrest.

In Roybal, the defendant was

involved in a collision with another vehicle.

The police officer

testified that the defendant had an odor of alcoholic beverage
about him, but
fairly

normal

appeared
manner,

to

and

be

coherent, seemed

didn't

have

any

to walk

problems

in a

talking.

Based on this set of circumstances, the Colorado Supreme Court
agreed

with

the

trial

court

and

held

that the

established probable cause for the arrest.

state had

not

The court noted that

although the officer's testimony and his decision to administer a
blood test were suggestive of an opinion that the defendant was
under the influence of alcohol, the only objective fact to which
the officer testified in support of his conclusion was the odor
of alcohol.
If an officer does not have reasonable grounds to believe
that an individual

is under the influence of alcohol then the

arrest

be

should

establish

not

intoxication

made.

Some

of

the

elements

which

may

are the smell of alcohol on defendant's

breath (State v. Bugger, 483 P. 2d 442 (Utah 1971); Layton City v.
Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1038 (Utah 1987)); slurred speech (Noon, 736
P.2d at 1038); poor balance fId.; Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P. 2d
778, 779-80 (Utah 1986)); drooling (Lopez, 720 P. 2d at 779); and
various field sobriety tests (Noon, 7<36 P. 2d at 1038; Lopez, 720
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P.2d

at

779-780).

intoxication,
"reasonable

In

while

and

position would

not

prudent
be

the

objective

instant

fact

alcohol.

person

that Officer
alone

to

justify

in

these

may

be

[the

indicators
enough

arresting

in believing

of

that

a

officer's]

that the suspect had

Noon, 736 P.2d at 1037.

case,

That

suspicion

exclusive,

justified

committed the offense."
In

combination

is

however,

as

Wasden

relied

insufficient

further

in

to

Roybal,
on was

only

an odor

establish

custodial

the

of

reasonable

interrogation,

and

therefore, there is no probable cause for the arrest.
B.

The field
sobriety
illegally obtained.

tests

were

It has been widely held that temporary detention for the
purpose

of

investigating

alleged

traffic

violations

is

not

synonymous with in-custody interrogation which requires a Miranda
warning.
State

v.

Salt Lake City v. Womack, 747 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1987);
East, 743

P.2d

1211

(Utah

earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983).
apprised
rather

of
than

his

Miranda

rights

investigatory.

1987);

Salt Lake Citv

v.

However, "An accused must be
if

In

the

other

setting
words,

is
at

custodial
the

point

environment becomes custodial or accusatory, a police questions
must be prefaced with a Miranda warning."
1170.

The Utah Supreme Court has

implication,

on

the

already

unconstitutionality
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Garner, 664 P. 2d at
ruled, by
and

negative

impropriety

of

sobriety

tests given

action.

In Garner the court allowed evidence of a field test

because there were

under

"no

the circumstances

of

the

instant

indicia of arrest such as handcuffs,

locked doors or drawn guns . . . present when officer asked the
defendant to perform the field sobriety tests."

Id. at 1171.

The court further implies that if a defendant is "forced, coerced
or intimidated into performing" the sobriety tests, the evidence
would have been unconstitutionally obtained.

Id. at 1172.

Absent the results of the field sobriety tests the officer
did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant.

There is no

indication that the field sobriety tests were not satisfactorily
performed
existed

by

the

for the

defendant
arrest.

and

therefore

no

probable

cause

The only evidence obtained by the

officer which would justify probable cause for DUI arrest are
not the results of the field sobriety tests, but only that the
officer

detected

an

odor

of

alcohol,

which

by

itself

is

insufficient.
The most recent case which deals with this issue is the
February 7, 1991 decision from the Utah Supreme Court, State of
Utah v. Johnson,

P.2d

(Utah 1991).

In Johnson, the

Utah Supreme Court outlined the three levels of police stops.
These three levels are as follows:
1. [A]n officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his
will.
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2. an officer may seize a person if the officer has an
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop";
3. an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense had been committed or is
being committed." Johnson, pg 2 of the slip opinion.
The

Court

went

further

to

explain

necessary

to

justify

level

two

arrests.

The following is a recital of the issues laid out by

and

the

three

various
police

elements

stops

and

the Utah Supreme Court as held in Johnson regarding stops and
arrests.
"'When an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation,
he may briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants while he
examines the vehicle registration and the driver's license.'
State v. Schlosser, 774 P2d. 1132. The length and scope of the
detention must be '...strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 19-20 (1968).
In addition, as the State
point out, the fourth amendment allows officers to further detain
the vehicle and its occupants when the driver fails to produce
identification or is not the owner.
United States v. Harris,
528 F.2d 1327 13-30 (8th/ circuit 1975)
In justifying the
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion. Terry v. Ohio f 392 U.S. at 21. While the lack of a
registration certificate and the fact that the occupants did not
own the car raised the possibility that the car might be stolen,
this information, without more, does not rise to the level of an
articulable suspicion that he car was stolen. As Judge Orme of
the Court of Appeals stated in his dissent, the 'facts are just
as consistent with the more likely scenario that the driver
borrowed the car from its rightful owner.' State v. Johnson, 771
P2d at 329."
The Utah Court of Appeals also recently handed down their
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opinion regarding investigatory stops.

In State v. Steward, 153

Utah Ado. Rep. 24 (1991), the Court held as follows:
The fourth amendment provides that 'the right of the people
to be secure in their person, houses, papers , and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated...' U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
Consistent therewith the Utah Supreme Court has held
that there are three levels of police-citizen encounters,
each of which requires a different degree of justification
to be constitutionally permissible....11 (see above).
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States
Supreme Court first articulated the narrow level two exception
to allow police officers, in certain circumstances, to make
limited intrusions on an individual's personal security based on
less than probable cause.
The stopping of a vehicle and the
consequent detention of its occupants constitute a level two
"seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, even if
the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention
brief. State v. Sierra 754 P2d. 972 {Ut. Ct. App. 1988).
In the case before us, the trial court and both parties
treated the matter a level two encounter.
Such a stop requires
that
'the officer have a reasonable suspicion, based on
objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal
activity.' State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985)...'Absent
reasonable suspicion, evidence derived from the stop is fruit of
the poisonous tree and must be excluded.' State v. Baird, 763 P2d
1214, 1216 (Utah 1988).
There is no bright line test for what is, or in not,
reasonable suspicion.
Id.
Whether the officer had reasonable
suspicion depends on the 'totality of the circumstances.' Id.
The 'totality of the circumstances' analysis must be based upon
all the circumstances and must 'raise a suspicion that the
particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.'
U.S. v. Cortez f 449 U.S. 404 (1981).
Put differently, the
officers must have a 'particularized and objective basis for
suspecting criminal activity by the particular person detained.'
State v. Seryr 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Thus in Brown v. Texas, 443, U.S. 47 (1979), the United
States Supreme Court held that the mere presence of a person in a
neighborhood frequented by drug users does not give rise to a
reasonable suspicion that such person is involved in criminal
conduct.
In Carpena, the Utah Supreme Court held that a slowly
moving vehicle, with out-of-state plates, in a neighborhood in
which a number of burglaries had occurred, without more, is
insufficient to support reasonable suspicion to justify detention
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of the occupants thereof.
In State v. Truiillo, 7 39 P. 2d 85
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), a stop based on the lateness of the hour
and the high-crime factor in the area was found to be
unconstitutional
because
the officer lacked a reasonable
suspicion as to Trujillo, the individual stopped.
and, in
Sierra, we held that no reasonable suspicion existed when such
was solely based on out-of-state plates, the occupant / s
suspicious appearance and his reaction upon observing a police
officer. State v. Steward, 153 Utah Ado. Rep. 24, 25-26 1991).
In the instant case we have what would appear to be a level
2 stop, but there

is not

sufficient

independent

corroborating

evidence to justify a level 3 detention.

Therefore, since the

officers

a

did

not

have

justification

for

level

3

stop

as

outlined in Johnson and Steward, the arrest was illegal and the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
C.
The

Defendant's pre-arrest statements
were illegally obtained.

defendant

contends

that

the

pre-arrest

statements made by him were illegally obtained.

inculpatory

At the time the

statements were made, the defendant was outside of his vehicle
and the statements were made in response to Officer Wasden direct
questioning.

The

defendant

was

not

free

to

leave

and

had

submitted to the custody of the officer.
Section

77-7-1 of the Utah Code, as amended, provides in

pertinent part that

lf

An arrest

is an actual restraint of the

person arrested or submission to custody«

(Emphasis added.)

Defendant contends that his statements were made while his
freedom

of

action

was

curtailed
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to

a

degree

associated

with

formal arrest.

Salt: Lake City v. Womack, 747 P. 2d 1039 (Utah

1987), Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983), and
State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1987).

While the defendant

was not under formal arrest, he had submitted to the officer's
custody and was not free to leave the scene.
The case at bar presents a clear demarcation line to apply
the ruling in Garner as to when a Miranda warning is required.
At the time defendant's pre-arrest inculpatory statements were
made, defendant was outside of his vehicle and was not free to
leave the scene.

Furthermore, the defendant had acceded to the

officer's request to exit his vehicle and subject himself to the
officer's instructions and custody.

The setting had therefore

become custodial rather than investigatory, since the focus of
attention was directed to the defendant.
D.

Fifth Amendment Violation

Officer Wasden's method of obtaining the evidence upon which
to base probable cause for the arrest was a flagrant violation of
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the
Article

I, Section

Amendment states:

12 of the Utah Constitution.

The Fifth

"No person . . . shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ."
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution similarly states:
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"The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself. . . . "
In this case the defendant was compelled by the duress
applied by the officer when he was compelled to perform field
sobriety tests, to give evidence against himself.

The defendant

further contends that he had been deprived of his liberty and was
not free to leave the

scene—a

violation of the

fundamental

purpose of this constitutional provision.
CONCLUSION
Officer Wasden did not have reasonable suspicion to stop
Harold's vehicle.

The only reason officer Wasden stopped the

vehicle was for an alleged wide turn made by Harold.

If officer

Wasden stopped every car in the Salt Lake Valley which made a
wide turn, officer Wasden would have no other duty than writing
traffic tickets.

Clearly, Officer Wasden stopped Harold as a

pretext for further

investigation

into a more serious crime.

Additionally, since Officer Wasden had no reasonable suspicion to
stop

Harold's

vehicle,

and

since

the

alleged

indicia

of

intoxication and the field coordination procedures should have
been suppressed, the argument holds that Officer Wasden also did
not have probable cause to arrest Harold for the alleged DUI.
Therefore, the Court should dismiss the charges against Harold as
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a matter of law.

—~7

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ -~dav of-a*rne, 1991

o^y

L. -Song- /
Lawyer for Defendant
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APPENDIX 7.
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
-oOo' SALT LAK E CITY,

)
Plaintiff,

vs.
HAROLD BECKSTEAD,

)

Case No.

)

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT

9120109037TC

1

)

Defendant.

)

|

-oOo-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 12th day of August,
1991 , commencing at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the above-entitled
matter came on for hearing before the Honorable n.D.

JONES

sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the purpose of
this cause, and that the following proceedings were had.
-oOoA P P E A_ R A N

C E S

For the City:

MS. JANICE FROST
City Prosecutor's Office
451 South 200 East, #125
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

For the Defendant:

MR. LARRY LONG
Attorney at Law
39 East Exchanqe Place, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705

ALAN P. SMITH, CSR

m?i

J

385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107

P R O C E E D I N G S

[Prior proceedings recorded but not requested to

!

be transcribed.]
THE COURT:
MR. LONG:

Mr. Long?
I'n not sure what your Honor's desires

|
i
J
i
i

are about lunch, do you want ne to continue o r —
THE COURT:
MR. LONG:

Yes, we'll go ahead.
All right.

j

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. LONG:
Q

Officer Wasden--it's Lieutenant Wasden, I should say.

A

That's okay,

Q

Let ne just hand you, so we can kind of get a

picture of this, Defendant's Exhibits D-l, D-2, D-3, and see
if those accurately represent the traffic lane, the outside
traffic lane facing southward from say Third South intersections
A

Yes, if you were--if you were back further.

I

assume what I'm looking at from here is you're just south of
the 300 South curb line, just south of the bus stop.
doesn't show the bus stop in that first one.

It

The same in this

one, so you1re further south, almost to the corner of 400
South.
And then this looks like there at the Exchange, where
the curb comes back out at Exchange.
2
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So, what this shows is

J

more-Q

You're referring to D-l?

A

D-l, yes, uh huh

(affirmative).

It's not as far

back as the bus stop, I — as I look at that, I don't—you knov;,
and I assume the bus stop is back behind there, further north
from there.
Q

There's a bus stop and~-

Well, does it accurately represent the view that vou

would get, say, from the bus stop on southward?
A

That's what I recognize it at, yes.

Q

All right.
MR. LONG:

I would tender this as an exhibit just for

demonstrative purposes to shov; what the--the scene was like as
Officer Wasden saw it.
THE COURT:

Counsel?

MS. FROST:

I don't have any objection.

THE COURT:

May be received.

MR. LONG:

May I publish this photograph?

THE COURT:
Q

Yes.

(By Mr. Long)

And Exhibit D-2, does it also

accurately represent the —
A

It appears to be just a little further south,

standing looking south on State Street.

You're c o m i n g —

getting a little closer to Exchange Street with 400 South.
It's a little difficult to follow the curb line because of the
parked vehicles, but-3
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Q

Uh huh (affirmative).

And also Defendant's Exhibit

A

In that third exhibit, clear—you know, it shows

3?

there at Exchange hov; the curb comes back out, and that looks
to me, appears to me to be Exchange and State Street southbound.
Q

All right.

A

And shows how the curb line juts out.
MR. LONG:

I would tender Defendant's Exhibit 2 and

3 for demonstrative purposes, your Honor,
THE COURT:

Ms. Frost?

MS. FROST:

No objection.

THE COURT:

May be received.

MR. LONG:
THE COURT:
Q

May I publish them?
Yes, sir.

(By Mr. Long)

And let me hand you what's now been

marked as Defendant's Exhibit 4 and ask you if that accurately
represents a view of, as you were turning to go westbound
on Fourth South from Third—from State Street, would that
accurately represent the view you'd have?
A

Based on the buildings I'm seeing in this picture

on the south side, if that is in fact it, it would represent
Fourth South and State from the northwest corner.

I believe

that would be the drive-through and so that helps me recognize
that photo, so I—it looks to me like west—that northwest
4
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corner of Fourth South looking to the southwest.
MR. LONG:

I v/ould tender Defendant's Exhibit 4 as

demonstrative evidence.
THE COURT:

Ms. Frost?

MS. FROST:

No objection.

THE COURT:

May be received.

MR. LONG:
THE COURT:
Q

May I publish that?
Yes, sir.

(By Mr. Long)

And let me hand you what's been

marked as Defendant's Exhibit 5 and ask you if that would
accurately reflect a view facing east, approximately where
Mr. Beckstead pulled his car over?
A

I w o u l d — I ' d need to be able to see Cactus Street

to put it in perspective.

It does appear to be looking east

on Fourth South, maybe, you know, in my estimation, midblock between Cactus, about a quarter block west of State
Street, and I believe a little further west than this picture
shows.
Q

I see.

But it does accurately reflect what's a

little east of where he pulled over?
A

Fourth South and State?

Q

Uh huh

A

It accurately would depict a view of about, oh,

(affirmative).

N o . — N o . 25 o r — n o , No. 75, about No. 75 East on 400 South.
Q

All right.
_5
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MR. LONG:

I would tender Defendant's Exhibit No.

5, your Honor , as demonstrative.

!

i
i

THE COURT:

M.s. Frost?

MS. FROST:

Your Honor,

think it ! s relevant.

i

City objects.

I don't

The officer 1 s testified it's not where

he did whatever he did.
THE COURT:

j
i

I \zould sustain the objection on the

basis the officer said it's east of where the stop occurred.
MR. LONG:

j
|

But it's just showing what the street

i
j
j

looks like —
THE COURT:
MR. LONG :

Well---that he first drove down before he

stopped.
THE COURT:

Well, v/hat is the purpose of the

exhibit?
MR. LONG:

Well, to sho w that this lane here is

20-some feet \ /ide, and that there are n o — n o markings here
for parked cars, or a parking lane.
THE COURT:

Well, it wi 11 be admitted for that

purpose only.
MR, LONG:
THE COURT:
MR. LONG:

All right.
But not as the location of the stop.
That's fine, your Honor.

May I publish

this?
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
6
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1

Q

(By Mr. Long)

And let me hand you what has been

ma rked as Defendant 1 s Exhibit 6 and ask you if that accurately !
re presents a view of the sidewalk approximately whe re the
field sobriety tests were conducted?

A

Boy , I'll have a real hard time with that , because

th ere ' s nothing that clearly indicates.

We were ju st east of

Cactus Street and I can't nut this photo into any p erspective.

It coul d have been a number of locations along the downtown
[ area.

The sidewa Ik would be similar to what's, s hown here.

Q

Well, maybe I could introduce it just for the

pu.rpose that that f s what the sidewalk--

A

This is th e type of sidewalk area that we we re on.

Q

Right.

A

I don't know that that's of the exact location.

Th at's —

MR. LONG:
THE COURT:
MR. LONG :

I would t e n d e r Ms. Frost?
--Defendant's Exhibit 6*

MS. FROST:

Well, your Honor, I still wou Id object.

THE COURT:

Let me see it.

MS. FROST:

— c a n ' t be isolated to the area, then

If it's —

it 1 s difficult to prove that it's relevant.

MR. LONG:
THE COURT:

The sidewalk along that whole block i s —
Well, I appreciate the point, Counsel,
2
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but I th ink the objection would be sustained on this one.
Thank you, sir.
(By Mr. Long)

Q

Do you happen to remember what

business was in front ot where the field coordination
procedures were conducted?
A

I don't.

Q

Let me hand you what's been narked as Defendant's

Exh ibit 1Vo.

9t

and you can see the intersection with Cactus

Str<2et there, and per haps that accurately reflects the
side2 walk p
A

Yes.

That 1 s — that's Cactus Street and that — that f s

the area there in, right in through there, v/here we did have
the stop •
Q

Thank you.
MR. LONG:

9/

]

I would tender Defendant's Exhibit No.

/our Honor,
MS. FROST:

No objection.

THE COURT:

May be received*

MR. LONG:
THE COURT:
Q

May I publish it?
Yes, sir.

(By Mr. Long)

And let me hand you what's been

mar ked as Defendant's; Exhibits 7 and 8, and ask you if those
are also what ! s in that general area?
A

Once again, I — I

can't tell an area from the

so there are — the bricks are innerlaid into
<
pho togra phs , and
8
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the sidewalk at places and there are the decorative ornamental
iron things there, between the actual walking, sidewalk area
and the curb and similar to what these pictures depict; but
I don f t know that it's the same area.
Q

All right.

A

I can't identify it from the pictures.
MR. LONG:

I cannot.

I would tender these exhibits, your

Honor, merely as illustrative of the type of--of brickwork
and they have planter boxes and trees going out of them, with
concrete around that and the brickwork that's kind of interlaced in between them.
MS. FROST:

City objects, your Honor.

The officer

can't put this in the area that he was in, and Exhibit No. 9,
previously admitted, shows that information-THE COURT:

Let's see the other exhibit.

MS. FROST:

— a n d has been identified as the area.

THE COURT:

The one that was admitted.

MR. LONG:

I think maybe one of the other ones might

show the planters better.
THE COURT:

I w o u l d — I would sustain the objection

to these because there's—the officer can't identify them.
MR. LONG:
THE COURT:

Maybe this makes it more easy to see.
Well, that has been already admitted.

It shows, however, the southwest corner of Fourth South,
doesn't it?
o
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MR. LONG:
THE COURT:
MR. LONG:

You're right.
That shows the southwest corner,
Oh, that's right, that's the turn.

That's

the other side of the street.
THE COURT:

Yeah, that's the other side of the

street.
I--I would sustain the objection because the
foundation, the officer's identification doesn't provide
foundation for it.
MR. LONG:
THE COURT:
MR. LONG:

He says he doesn't know.
I think one of those has been published.
No, I crave you the one that —
Those two a r e — y o u ' r e going to keep out

and this o n e —
THE COURT:

This one has already been.

I'll sustain

the objection on this one.
MR. LONG:
THE COURT:

Well, that one was introduced, I think.
No, this was not.

This is one I

sustained the objection on, because again-MR. LONG:
THE COURT:
MR. LONG:
THE COURT:
Q

Oh, all right.
— t h e officer couldn't-You're right.
—couldn't

(By Mr. Long)

You're right.

lay the foundation.

Now, as you were following, when you

first noticed Mr. Beckstead's vehicle, v/here were you?

Were

you approximately in the position of the Defendant's Exhibit
10
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No. 1, wh ich I've showed you?

1

A

No.

I would have been north of there.

Q

How far north would you have been?

A

North of 300 South.

j

Q

And where was Mr. Beckstead's vehicle?

j

A

My recollection is that he was in--approaching or

close to the intersection of 390 South.
Q

I see.

So, he went completely through the inter-

section amd you watched him?
A

I watched him go through the 300 South intersection.

Q

I see.

A

No, sir.

Q

And you never testified, when you testified before

And he didn't violate any traffic laws, did

he?

under oath, you didn't testify that he was going very slowly,
did you?
A

I don't recall.

Under—at the Driver's License

hearing?
Q

Right.

A

I donft recall if the question was asked.

Q

But anyway, he didn't do any kind of a traffic

violation that would warrant pulling him over; is that right?
A

A red light type of thing or anything like that, are

you asking?
Q

Right.
11
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A

No, sir,

0

So, v/hen you saw hin kind of moving down the street,

I think you said three to four feet, within his own lane; it's j
a rather a wide lane there, is it not?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And that would be Defendant's Exhibit 1, there?

A

Well, if — if you look into 1, 2 and 3, all three,

j

The outside lane is quite wide, especially!
i
where the—the parking lane and bus stop areas exist.
j

j

do you have all three of those there?
Q

I do.

A

If you look at all three of them, you can see the

curb line further north of here juts out substantially like it I
juts back in o n — a s you can see here, you can see it quite
clearly in that exhibit.

And so it was north of there that I

observed him coming through 300 South and then began to follov;
the curb line, weaving within that lane and just stay over into
that parking and bus stop area and then move back over, down
in this area.
Q

Uh huh (affirmative).

A

There weren't the cars parked there that are shown

in that photograph, so...
Q

So, there were no cars parked there at 11:30 at

night?
A

I don't — I don't recall any cars being parked in

that lane at all, in that parking and bus stop area.

U
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Q

So, in other \.Tords, if you--if there's nobodv

parked there, it is really a wide lane; ricrht?
A

Really a wide lane, yes, sir.

Q

Double lane.

So, none of the three to four foot

weaving of Mr. Beckstead didn't endanger any of the vehicles?
A

No, sir.

Q

I see.

It did not.

Nov;, I think it was your testimony before

when you said you wouldn't issue a traffic violation for it,
and that was the weaving?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

But you pulled hin over anyway?

A

Yes, sir.

0

And wasn't it because you—you had a hunch?

"I

suspected that he may have been drinking based on the driving
pattern I'd seen"?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

I see.

That's correct.

So, at that particular time, you suspected

that he'd been drinking and that was really the reason you
pulled him over?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

Now, he pulled over immediately, did he not?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And when he did, you had an unmarked police car,

so what kind of lights did you turn on?
A

What I had was the red-and-blue flashing grill
13
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1

lights, and a hand-pointed spotlight that's mounted and

2

f l a s h — i t puts a red light up into the back of his vehicle.
And there was no hesitation on his part?

3

Q

I see.

4

A

Nothing that I thought was exceptional.

I mean,

5

h e — h e recognized that I was a police officer, that the red

6

light was there from the time he was making his right turn

7

and pulled over before he got to Cactus Street, v/hich is three-

8

300 feet, maybe.

9
10

Q

All right.
MR. LONG:

I believe at this point, your Honor, I

11

would reinstate my motion to dismiss this case on the grounds

12

of pretext stop.

13

was the only reason that he pulled him over was he suspected

14

a drinking driver.

I think the officer's testimony just now

15

THE COURT:

Ms. Frost, do you wish t o —

16

MS. FROST:

Your Honor, I think that he had probable

17

cause based on the driving pattern to pull him over for a

18

suspected DUI.

19

require that he violate some other traffic lav/.

20

That's all the law requires, it doesn't

THE COURT:

The conditions existing in the way he

21

drove down the street, I think provided probable cause.

22

officer's training and background indicated there might be a

23

problem with alcohol.

24

and view, and your motion is denied, sir.

25

The

I think it's soundly based on experience

MR. LONG: I do have some cases on that I'd be happy
14
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1

to provide to the Court at lunch.
THE COURT:

2

I — I ' n aware of the cases.

But in this

3

specific instance, it was a very wide lane, which w a s — t u r n s ,

4

corp.es and has several indentations.

Mow, I do not believe

normal driving patterns would include following that curb
line through a bus stop and other parking areas.

it seems to

me that the normal, prudent way of driving that street was to
8

stay on the left-hand side where the lane is and drive straightj

9

down.

10

I think that turning in and out and the officer's

experience of 10 years is sufficient to--for probable cause.
MR. LONG:

11
12

Q

All right.

(By Mr. Long)

Now, I think your testimony v/as that

13

h e — t h a t he was in a truck so you couldn't really see who was

14

in t h a t — t h e truck, when you were following it?

15
16
17
18

A

Yes.

I c o u l d — I could not see easily from the rear

portion of the truck up to the front.
Q

And so I think it was your testimony that you

couldn't t e l l —
MS. FROST:

19
20

form of the question.

21

occasion.
THE COURT:

22
23
24
25

Q

Your Plonor, I'm going to object to the
This is not his testimony on this

Sustained.

(By Mr. Long)

So, in other words, you couldn't tell

whether Mr. Beckstead v/as looking at the sidewalk for someone?
A

No, sir.
15
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Q

I see.

And if they — i f that was the case, then it

would be a reasonable explanation for his weavinq, would it
not?
A

If that explanation had been proffered, sure.

Q

I see.

But you never asked him a question like

that, did you?
A

I explained to him why he v/as being stopped, I

explained what I observed and I explained my concerns with
the alcohol, and at no time did he tell me he was looking for
someone or that, you know, that v/as the case.
Q

And so when you first walked up to the window,

didn't you ask Mr. Beckstead, do you know why I pulled you
over?
A

I don't recall asking that question of Mr. Beckstead,

Q

You don't remember him saying, "No, I have no idea"?

A

No, sir.

0

And you don't remeruLer telling him it was because

he made a wide turn at the intersection of Fourth South and
State?
A

No.

In fact, he didn't make a wide turn.

Q

And drawing your attention to Defendant's Exhibit

D-5, shows that the—the lane there is enormous, doesn't it?
A

Again, I didn't feel he made a wide turn, so I

never discussed a wide turn with him.
Q

All right.
16
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A

Yeah.

Q

Now, you, I presume, asked Mr, Beckst ead to produce

It shows a very wide lane.

his driver's license p
A

I asked for the driver's license and registration

|
i

of h is ve h i d e .

i

i

Q

And there was no inordinate delay, or he didn't

i

j

have any t r o u b l e i

A

No, sir.

Q

--finding it?
And was it at that point that you not.iced that his

spee ch was slightly slurred?
A

As we were talking, I don't know the exact point,

I fe It th at his spee ch was not a normal speech pattern.
Q

And didn't you think that his speech was clear but

somewhat slurred?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And didn't you say that I don f t know Mr. Beckstead

and I dont't know if he speaks that way all the tine?
M S . FROST:

Again, your Honor , I'm going to object.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

[The reque sted portion of this transcript
ordered by Mr. Long was cone luded.]
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